

THIS REPORT IS TOP SECRET

Report on further information obtained from PW CS/1702 Oblt ARNTZ
A.D.C. to Chef der Wehrmachts Nachr
Verbindungen und Chef des Heeres Nachr
Wesens, surrendered nr ALZEY, 19 Mar 45.

Authority

11 THE GERMAN SIGNALS SERVICE

PREAMBLE

1. See SIR 1593.
2. PW has served with the Signals Arm since the beginning of the war and has occupied the position of ADC to Chef WNV and Chef HNW since December 43. His knowledge of signals personalities and organisation is very extensive and he has been able to supplement this knowledge with documents which he brought with him and which he has been able to bring up to date.
3. In more technical aspects of signalling and in matters affecting ciphers, procedure and equipment, PW's information is not so detailed. He does not, however, claim to be versed in these matters, nor does he appear to give information for the sake of displaying his knowledge. In consequence, all the information that he has given appears to be thoroughly reliable.
4. As PW has kept the documents in his possession up to date the information given below can be dated as at Mar 45.

A. ORGANISATION OF SIGNALS DEPARTMENTS
WITHIN THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND

STATUS OF GEN . Offices held and channels of Military Liaison
d NACHR TP
PRAUN

5. See Appendix 1.
6. In Mar 45 General PRAUN held the dual offices of OKW/WFSt/Chef WNV - Chef Wehrmachts Nachrichten Verbindung and of OKH/Chef HNW - Chef Heeres Nachrichten Wesen.



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As Chef WNV Gen PRAUN was directly subordinated to Genobst JODL of the Wehrmachts Führungsstab, and would seem to be responsible for all Signals matters from the Inter-Service point of view. As Chef HWV Gen PRAUN was responsible for Signals policy within the Field Army and in this capacity he was subordinated to Genobst GUDERIAN, Chief of General Staff.

7. In addition, Gen PRAUN enjoyed a personal link with the Inspekteur der Nachrichtentruppe under Chef Ausbildungswesen (OBdE). This link did not give Gen PRAUN the power to command, but subject to the maintenance of good personal relations, enabled him to influence the training of Signals personnel within the Replacement Army. Gen PRAUN enjoyed a similar liaison with Gen ARNOLD, Chef Ag N, a department within Allgemeines Heeresamt, which has incorporated the old In 7.
8. Liaison was also maintained directly with Oberst STUMMER of OKH/Chef H RU/Chef Wa J RU (Wu G 7), who was responsible for the ordering of Signals equipment, with Oberst HENIGST OKH/Chef H RU/Chef Wa Prüf 7, who was responsible for the development of Signals equipment and with Amtsrat KLASCHKE OKH/OBdE/Chef Fz In 4D, who was responsible for the quality of the equipment. PW has spoken of an imminent re-shuffle of these three departments, which is discussed in SIR 1614.
9. The story of Gen PRAUN's military liaisons did not end here, for in his capacity of General Bevollmächtigter für technische Nachrichtenmittel/Ag WNV, he was, in a sense, under the orders of SPEER, the Minister for Armaments, particularly in problems involving the evacuation of Sigs equipment industries.

Inter-Service Coordination

10. As Chef WNV Gen PRAUN's power to give orders on Signals matters to the Signals service of the Navy and Air Force was somewhat theoretical, for, according to PW, the exceedingly high rank occupied by GÖRING and DÖNITZ makes it impossible for an Army officer to give orders to any of their subordinates.
11. To facilitate coordination, matters of Inter-Service interest and policy were discussed at a monthly conference, which was attended by the heads of the Army, Air Force and Naval Signals services, by members of the Signals supply departments within the Army, and by the head of the SS Signals service (the latter enjoying complete immunity from control by the OKW). This conference was purely consultative, and although Gen PRAUN presided over it, it could not enforce a policy against the will of any of the heads of the Service Signals departments.
12. This absence of centralised control leads, in PW's opinion, to a very considerable re-duplication of Signals facilities, a wastage GERMANY can ill afford in her present situation.

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Future developments

13. The position as outlined above applied not only to Gen PRAUN but also to his predecessors, Gen THIELE and Gen FELLGIMBEL, both of whom were executed as a result of the 20 Jul Putsch.
14. It should be noted, however, that as a result of the policy of telescoping certain departments within the German High Command now that the war has closed in and reached GERMAN territory, certain changes are imminent in the Signals organisation within the Armed Forces.
15. Gen PRAUN is shortly to acquire the status of a "Waffen General". In this capacity his new title will be "der General der Nachrichten Truppe im OKW und OKH". It is anticipated that the General will, in addition to retaining his status as Chef WNV and Chef HWV, extend his authority to the Replacement Army, where he will be subordinated to HIMMLER, Chef H RÜ und B d E and JÜTTNER, Chef AHA. He will thereby acquire direct control over Amtsgruppe Nachrichten, over Pz In 4D and over the Inspekteur der Nachrichten Truppe.
16. It is furthermore envisaged that Gen PRAUN, in his new capacity, will be able to extend his authority to those departments dealing with Signals equipment that come within the scope of the Heeres Waffenamt, viz: Wa Prüf 7 and Wu G 7.
17. Gen PRAUN will have special powers of control over these departments. It has already been indicated on the other hand, see para 8, that these departments are about to be reorganised in other respects i.e. direct administrative control. How these two processes are to be combined is discussed in SIR 1614.
18. Relations with the Civil Authorities

It will be appreciated that Gen PRAUN's various interests involved him in questions of policy which affect not only the military but also the civil authorities. In particular problems relating to liaison with the Reichspost (relations with which have never been too good) and problems affecting the German Foreign Office's communications with neutral countries cannot be settled on the authority of Gen PRAUN alone, even in his capacity as Chef WNV. Gen PRAUN, therefore, acquires an additional subordination in that he must refer to Fd Mar KEITEL, HITLER's Deputy Comd in Chief, all matters of high policy which affect the Armed Forces Signals network, vis-à-vis the civil authorities.

B. OKW/WFuSt/WNV

- OKW/WFuSt/WNV 19. See Appendix 3 for table of organisation.

This department is controlled, as has been stated, by the Chef WNV assisted by a deputy. The deputy also enjoys the status of Chef Amtsgruppe WNV, and in this

20. The Amtsgruppe WNV is sub-divided into the following departments:

Zentral Gruppe (Z)- Central Department

Kriegsfernmeldeabteilung (KFA)- Line Communications

Abteilung General Bevollmächtigter für Techn Nachrichtenmittel (GBN)- Production in industries manufacturing Signals equipment etc. Liaison with Reichsminister SPEER. This department was formerly responsible for the Signals aspect of the 4-year plan

Abteilung Funkwesen (Fu)- WT communications

Chiffrier Abteilung (Chi) - Deciphering section

Ag WNV/Z

21. This department is sub-divided into the following sections:

Z Ia - Operations, organisation, War Diary.

Z Ib - Personnel section, war establishments, transfers, journeys, leave, standing instructions, etc.

Z Id - Administration, accounting, clothing and Q matters generally.

Z Ie - Liaison with Reichspost, reserving of Signals personnel for civilian occupation, business between the Armed Forces and the Reichspost in known technical matters.

Reg Ag WNV/Z -Registering of normal and secret letters (Top Secret correspondence was registered in the ante-room to Chef WNV).

Ag WNV/Kriegsfernmeldeamt

22. The department disposes of the following sub-sections (Stabsreferate):-

St/O - Mainly concerned with the internal office administration of the whole department. Also keeps personnel records and liaises with the Reichspost with regard to employment of key personnel

St/P - Planning and laying down of line communications, including cable, carrier frequency, decimetre and teleprinter facilities. It also controls the final employment of Reichspost technicians and is responsible for ensuring the line communications for the Führer HQ.

St/F - Handles matters concerning Wehrmachts Nachrichten Offizier at Führer HQ.

KFA I - Controls the establishment of line networks. Is responsible for the protection of Signals installations against air raid damage (in collaboration with St/P). Arrangement of communications for special trains. Also employed for special purposes outside the Armed Forces, in particular for communications with nations allied to GERMANY. Handles priorities in telephone operating.

KFA II -Provision of raw materials, priorities and supply, control of storage dumps for technical and telegraphic equipment.

KFA III - Control of records and plans of special networks.

Registry - Maintenance of register for secret and non-secret correspondence.

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23. Ag WNV/GBN is sub-divided as follows:

- GBN/A - Internal office administration
- GBN/B - Supply questions, provision of spare parts
- GBN/St - Execution of special tasks, problems of metals in short supply
- GBN/I - Apparatus for line communications
- GBN/II - Apparatus for WT and special methods of communication
- GBN/III - Problems of war economics, questions of industry, labour, raw materials, priorities.
- GBN/IV - Valves
- GBN/Reg - Register of secret and non-secret correspondence
Top Secret correspondence was registered in the ante-room of the departmental chief.

Ag WNV/Fu

24. This department is sub-divided into the following sections:

- Fu I - Organisation, war establishments, basic Signals regulations
- Fu Ia - WT communications, Führer HQ officers records, war diary
- Fu Ia¹ - Collation and distribution of codes and ciphers, compiling of cipher regulations, maintenance of personnel records for ORs. This section liases with Gruppe IV/HNW
- Fu Ib - Rules of WT procedure, allocation of wavelengths, jamming policy, control of mobile transmitters, location of hostile stations in GERMANY
- Fu II - Provision of equipment for Signals security and monitoring, units' priorities, allocation of raw materials, ordering of transport, maintenance of agents' sets
- Fu III - Control of Signals security and monitoring, collaboration with other security organisations. (See Section below dealing with OKW WT security)
- Fu Reg - Registry for top secret, secret and non-secret correspondence

Ag WNV/Chi

25. Ag WNV/Chi consists of the following sections:

- Chi Z - Personnel matters, general office
- Chi I - Organisation
- Chi II - Evaluation of WT traffic
- Chi III - Interception of WT traffic. This section had a technical WT expert in Y matters
- Chi IV - Deciphering section
- Chi V - Line communication section
- Chi X - Special section. PW states that this section deals with the deciphering of traffic sent by Allied agents.

CHEF HNW

26. See Appendix 3.

In his capacity as Chef HNW Gen PRAUN had two main subordinates, the Kommandeur der Führungs Nachrichten Truppe and the Chief of Staff HNW.

KDR d Fu
NACHR TP

27. The Kommandeur der Führungs Nachrichten Truppe is responsible for the administrative control, but not operational employment, of the numerous Führungs Nachrichten Regimenter (GHQ Sigs units). These units provide the communications for FHQ, OKW, OKH and communications forward from there to the various army groups and higher commands in the field. The Kommandeur der Führungs Nachrichten Truppe is also responsible for the administrative control of the General d Nachrichten Aufklärung and the Vorschriftenstelle d HNW. (For further details of the General d Nachrichten Aufklärung see section of this report dealing with German intercept service).

CHIEF OF
STAFF HNW

28. The Chief of Staff is assisted by an Ia, who controls the following departments:

Gruppe I - This is divided into the following sub-sections:

I¹ - Organisation

I² - Operations

I² - Situation map, top secret correspondence, password, recognition signals, war diary, liaison with other departments of the General Staff.

I³ - Training (presumably for the field army)

I⁴ - Truppen Nachrichten Verbände. According to PW this department deals with the Signals sub-units in other arms of the service, such as arty or engineers.

I⁵ - Equipment.

Gruppe II - This section deals with equipment; its work, however, has recently been taken over by the Nachrichten Gerät Abt, which is subordinated to the Chef Amtsgruppe Nachrichten in the Replacement Army, and Gruppe II no longer exists.

Gruppe III - Line communications section. This section consists of 5 officers, 3 officials and clerical personnel. It deals with matters of telephone exchanges, carrier frequencies, long-distance communication, railway telephone communications etc. PW does not know the exact number of sub-sections in this department.

Gruppe IV - WT Section. Consists of 2 officers, 1 official and clerical personnel. PW cannot give the layout within the department.

Gruppe V - Formerly dealt with communications along railway lines. This department has now been liquidated and its functions have been taken over by a section of Gruppe III.

HNW controls the departments which determine Signals policy and organisation for Signals Units within the field army. High issues of Signals policy are invariably communicated to the Forces in the field either by Chef HNW or by the Chief of Staff HNW. This would apply, for instance, to the introduction of the Rasterschlüssel within the German Army. Routine matters, such as the alteration of recognition signals, would be communicated directly by the Gruppen concerned. The departments of Chef HNW pass their orders directly to the higher Signals Officer at OB WEST for units on the Western Front, and to the army group comds concerned for units on the Eastern Front.

D. OKH REPLACEMENT ARMY - DEPARTMENTS
CONCERNED WITH THE ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS
OF SIGNALS UNITS

(For organisation table of these departments in the Replacement Army see Appendix 4).

30. This officer is responsible for the training and efficiency of the Signals units within the Replacement Army under the general orders of the Chef d Ausbildungswesen. He confers frequently, however, with Gen PRAUN and is very much subject to his advice. The Inspekteur d Nachr Tp, in addition to his supervision of Signals replacement units, is directly responsible for the training given at the Heeres Nachr Schule, HALLE, the Heeres Uffz Schule für Nachr Tp, ZERBST, and the Heeresschule für Nachr Helferinnen, COBURG.

CHEF AMTSGRUPPE 31.
NACHR WESEN

PW states that this office has been in operation for the last 2 years. It has taken the place of or rather embodied, the remnants of In 7. The Chef of Amtsgruppe Nachr, Genmaj ARNOLD, assisted by a Chief of Staff, is directly under the orders of Ognr JÜTNER, Chef IHA. General ARNOLD controls the HQ of the Amtsgruppe Nachr, the Nachr Tp Abt and the Nachr Gerät Abt.

HQ AMTSGRUPPE 32.
NACHR WESEN

The Amtsgruppe is divided into the following sections:

Personal Gruppe - Personnel questions

Verwaltungs Gruppe - Administration

Gruppe NH - Nachr Helferinnen (Female Signals personnel)

Registratur - Registry for correspondence

NACHR TP ABT 33.

This department is the old Inspektion 7, i.e. the Signals Inspectorate. According to PW, Inspektion 7 was dissolved 2 years ago and re-christened under its present name. This office is divided into the following sections:

Gruppe Ia - Organisation

Gruppe Ib - Administration

Gruppe Ic - War diary, propaganda, training

Gruppe Id - Matters affecting fortress Signals units.

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INSPEKTEUR
NACHR TP

34. It should be noted that In 7, Gruppe VI, otherwise known as OKH/Chi, the deciphering department of the O.H, has disappeared. PW says that this department was dissolved in Dec 44 and was absorbed jointly by OKW/WNV/Chi and by the General d Nachr Aufkl. (For more detailed information on this subject see section on German Intercept Service). Prior to its dissolution in Dec 44, OKH In 7/VI was known as Ag N/Chi.

35. This office is responsible for issuing Signals equipment to units. It is not responsible for its quality, for its production or for the development of Signals equipment. The office is divided into 2 departments, Gruppe IIIa and IIIb, the functions of which PW is unable to explain.

36. As has already been stated in the introductory paras on Gen PRAUN's status, there are certain other departments of the OKH which are concerned with Signals equipment. They are:

OKH/Chef H Rii/Chef Wa J Rii (Wu G 7). Ordering and production of equipment,

OKH/Chef H Rii/Chef Wa Prüf 7. Development of new Signals equipment

OKH/AHL/Chef Fz In 4 D. Quality of equipment.

PW understands that when Gen PRAUN acquires the status of Waffen General his authority to control the affairs of these departments will be considerably strengthened.

B. THE GERMAN INTERCEPT SERVICES,
MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

(For organisation table see Appendix 3).

37. The German Military, Political and Economic Signals Intelligence Services are carried out by the following agencies:

OKW/Ag WNV/Chi

General d Nachr Aufkl (Chef HNW)

OKM/Chi

OKL/Chi (PW believes this dept is known as the Reichsforschungsamt).

38. Apart from the Security Intercept Service (see paras 63 to 66), there may be additional Y agencies in GERMANY of which PW is unaware. He is convinced, however, that there is no central intercept authority and that, although the four departments mentioned above may consult between themselves and exchange information, there is no central coordinating policy.

39. Prior to Dec 44 the Gruppe VI of the late Inspektion 7 also undertook deciphering work for the Army. PW considers the location of this department within Ag/N to have been somewhat anomalous and states that during the recent policy of rationalisation its personnel has been allocated to OKW/WNV/Chi and to the General d Nachr Aufkl respectively.

40. See Appendix 2.

This department appears to be primarily responsible for the evaluation and dissemination of Y information in the economic and diplomatic fields. PW is quite emphatic that tactical and strategical information is handled by the General d Nachr Aufkl. He is moreover of the opinion that OKW/WNV/Chi only tackles the code-breaking problems of its own directorate and that it does not act as a final centre for breaking codes which the General d Nachr Aufkl cannot cope with.

41. It should be noted that, although PW is cognisant of the work carried on in OKW/WNV/Chi, he cannot give any information on the units or stations engaged in picking up economic, political and diplomatic traffic.

General d Nachr Aufkl

42. See Appendix 3.

This office was headed by Oberst BOETZEL who controlled all intercept units in the army and enjoyed the status of a div comd. Gen BOETZEL's personal HQ is equipped with a small signals and intercept service for its own purposes.

43. The setting-up of the office of General d Nachr Aufkl in Autumn 44 reflected two facts; firstly that intercept information was now recognised to constitute about 95% of German military intelligence data; and secondly that, with the shortening of the fighting fronts and their proximity to the German borders, it was advisable to coordinate the intercept services more closely.

44. The main task of the HQ General d Nachr Aufkl is to coordinate the two evaluation centres, Leitstelle d Nachr Aufkl (WEST) and Leitstelle d Nachr Aufkl (OST). The former moved from LOETZEN to ZOSSEN in Nov 44; the latter had been permanently in ZOSSEN.

45. Although these two departments have now been associated under the General d Nachr Aufkl they still maintain their separate functions, the one of evaluating Anglo-American traffic on the Western Front and the other of evaluating Russian traffic on the Eastern Front.

Units subordinate to General d Nachr Aufkl

46. The General d Nachr Aufkl controls intercept units which are attached to all the higher German formations in the field. As a general rule the highest Signals intelligence formation encountered is that of the Kommandeur d Nachr Aufkl; he enjoys the status of regt comd.

47. Owing to the supreme importance of the intercept effort in the WEST, Obst KOPP was appointed Hdh Kdr d Nachr Aufkl beim OB WEST, with the status of Brigadekommandeur and with two Kommandeure and an Abt under him. This office was designed to speed up the collation of intercept intelligence between the army groups and the evaluation centre in BERLIN. The nominal scale for the allocation of intercept units was 1 Kommandeur d Nachr Aufkl per army group, but there were exceptions.

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DEPARTMENTS
CONCERNED WITH
INTERCEPT
(contd.)

48. The allocation of German intercept units was as follows:

Höh Kdr d Nachr Aufkl beim OB WEST O OB WEST
Nachr Aufkl Abt 9 - Heeres Gruppe H
Nachr Aufkl Regt 6 - Heeres Gruppe B
Nachr Aufkl Regt 5 - Heeres Gruppe G
Nachr Aufkl Regt 7 - OB SÜD-WEST (ITALY)
Nachr Aufkl Abt 16 - OB SÜD-OST
Nachr Aufkl Regt 8 - Heeres Gruppe SÜD
Nachr Aufkl Regt 1 - Heeres Gruppe "MITTE"
Nachr Aufkl Regt 2 - Heeres Gruppe WEICHSEL
Nachr Aufkl Regt NORD - Heeres Gruppe NORD
Nachr Aufkl Regt 3 - Heeres Gruppe KURLAND
Nachr Aufkl Abt 11 - AOK 20 (NORWAY)
Feste Nachr Aufkl Stelle LÖKKEN - German military comd
in DENMARK

49. It is worth noting that none of these intercept units are of identical strengths. A greater part in the intercept effort has recently been allotted to the Western Front with the transfer of KNA 6 from the Russian front to the front of Army Group B.

General

RESULTS OF
INTERCEPT WORK

50. As has been stated already, intercept intelligence accounts for the bulk of German military intelligence. PW says that Gen PRAUN was congratulated by Genobst GUDERIAN, who stated that 95% of German Army intelligence was provided by the intercept service. PW was unable to say how far this should be regarded as reflecting the excellence of intercept and how far the inadequacy of other intelligence methods. Consequently PW states that he has observed no tendency, even in the recent critical situation, to send key intercept personnel into the fighting line.

51. In general it is the opinion of intercept authorities e.g. Obst KETTLER (until recently Chef WNV/Chi) that the majority of Anglo-American ciphers, including high grade ciphers, can be broken. This does not, however, hold good for Russian high grade ciphers, since high grade Russian traffic is re-ciphered several times and is therefore exceedingly difficult to break.

52. High German intercept officers believe that the Allies are having an equal degree of success in deciphering German WT traffic.

German Signals Intelligence during the ARNHEM Operation

53. It is interesting to note, nevertheless, that during the ARNHEM operation KNA 5 provided no Signals intelligence on Allied traffic sent during the airborne landing in Sep 44. As a result of the failure of KNA 5 to provide the General Staff with the necessary information, Gen PRAUN had to detail a number of signallers from the Heeres Waffenamt to monitor Allied traffic at ARNHEM.

54. As showing the importance of the personal element, PW attributes this failure entirely to the fact that Obstlt Baron von OER (Comd KNA 5) was very ill throughout the operation and lost control of the situation. He was relieved of his comd and replaced by Maj LECHNER, formerly one of the senior officers in OXV/Chi

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MOVEMENTS OF
GERMAN INTER-
CEPT DEPARTMENTS

55. OKW/WNV/Chi and General d Nachr Aufkl were both to move to Heeres Nachr Schule HALLE in the middle of Mar 45. (See SIR 1593, Appendix 1, item 14).

INTERCEPT
PUBLICATIONS

OKW/WNV/Chi

56. This department issued a daily publication entitled "Chi Nachrichten". The document was in book form and was graded G Kdos; in all about 40 copies were issued. It consisted primarily of diplomatic digests and wireless intercepts, principally of a political character, from enemy countries, the main sources being the big agencies such as REUTERS. It is worth noting that the high secrecy grading for this publication is explained not only by a desire to safeguard the security of Y information, but also to prevent disheartening political information from being distributed too widely.
57. A very secret Appendix to "Chi Nachrichten" was published as the occasion arose; this document was graded G Kdos but could only be opened by the addressee. Its distribution was confined to Gen PRAUN (in his capacity as the ultimate head of the German Y service), Field Marshal KEITEL, and Reichsführer SS HIMMLER. The Appendix contained compromising political information which it was considered exceedingly inadvisable to disclose. Under this heading PW cites certain comments from foreign sources on the late Field Marshal KLÜGE and General STÜLPNAGEL in connection with the events of 20 Jul. The further distribution of this type of information lay in the hands of Field Marshal KEITEL and Reichsführer SS HIMMLER.
58. A publication known as "VN" (Verslächliche Nachrichten) was also issued by WNV/Chi. This document which contained a digest of traffic intercepted from Allied agents was also G Kdos and could only be opened by the addressee. The traffic reported on in "VN" was not only traffic from Allied agents in GERMANY, but also from agents in neutral countries. PW states that the information was provided by WNV/Chi/X, who obtained it partly from Ag WNV/Fu III, which was the department responsible for monitoring Allied agents in GERMANY and the occupied countries.
59. General d Nachr Aufkl
- This Comd issued three main publications of grade G Kdos, "Nachrichten Aufklärungs Lage West", "Nachrichten Aufklärungs Lage Ost", and "Rundfunk Nachrichten", the latter consisting of intercepts from enemy GHQ communiques.

INTERCEPTION OF
TRANSATLANTIC
CABLE TRAFFIC

60. In Nov 44 PW attended a discussion between General PRAUN, Obst KETTLER (Chef WNV/Chi) Obst ROSENKRANZ (Chef WNV/Fu) and Obst GRUBE (Chef WNV/GBN). At this conference PW heard it stated that "Breitband Empfänger" had been attached to the LONDON - NEW YORK submarine cable, and that the traffic passing along it was being monitored. PW cannot give any further information on the equipment or on the technical problems involved, nor does he know what success is being experienced in intercepting the traffic on this route.

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61. After a conference with the Japanese Attaché group on 16 Mar 45, arrangements were concluded to send a German intercept mission to JAPAN. The mission was to be headed by Maj OPITZ (see SIR 1602, Appendix, Item 39), a very distinguished German intercept officer, accompanied by 3 specialists. It was understood that the Japanese Government wished to be informed of the most recent technical equipment used in intercept work and also required briefing in Allied codes and ciphers. Major OPITZ was to take special equipment and cipher information with him. The Germans, for their part, consider Maj OPITZ will be able to pick up traffic in JAPAN, which, for technical reasons, it is difficult to pick up in GERMANY. OPITZ was to travel to JAPAN by submarine but PW does not know the proposed date of his departure.

62. PW knows no details of an SS Y service. He has heard recently that several SS personnel have been seconded to duty with OKW/WNV/Chi.

F. GERMAN INTERCEPT SERVICES - SECURITY

63. See Appendix 2.

PW does not profess to know much about this subject. He states that the responsibility for Signals security, within the Wehrmacht rests with OKW/Ag WNV/Fu III. This section is called upon to monitor WT traffic to ensure that Signals security instructions are obeyed, and to detect and monitor the traffic of enemy agents within the Reich and German occupied territory. The head of this section is Maj von BARY, who also enjoys the title of Kommandeur d Funk-Überwachung OKW (cf SIR:1106).

64. Maj von BARY has at his disposal Signals formations which have been allotted to the OKW by Gen PRAUN in his capacity as Chef HNW. His organisation comprises the Überwachungs Regt OKW (with some coys attached), and is composed of:

Funk Überwachungs Abt 1. An army unit stationed in the WEST, with monitoring stations in HANOVER and KOEGE (see SIR 1112)

Funk Überwachungs Abt 2. A GEF unit operating in the SOUTH and SW of GERMANY with monitoring stations in GRAZ and near Lake CONSTANZ.

Funk Überwachungs Abt 3. An army unit operating on the Eastern Front, with monitoring stations at CRANZ and in UPPER SILESIA.

PW cannot give any more detailed information on how these units are sub-allotted, or to what Signals staff they are attached. He believes there is another special monitoring station in COPENHAGEN.

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65. The traffic of enemy agents is picked up by the Funk Überwachungs Coys and is passed back by them to OKW/WNV/Fu III, where the information is collated and, if in cipher, passed to WNV/Chi/X, for deciphering.
66. So far as enemy agents are concerned, Maj von BARY's responsibility is restricted to the location of their transmitters and the breaking of their traffic. The decision to capture the agent concerned is taken by other security departments, to whom Maj von BARY passes the results of his monitoring.

67. In Nov 44, in the course of a conversation with Gen PRAUN, Maj von BARY mentioned that an Allied agent had been picked up in communication with LONDON. In his transmission the agent had drawn attention to the importance of the BENDLER BLOCK as a German communications centre and requested that it be bombed. PW does not know whether this message was received, nor what happened to the agent from whom the message originated, but he states that a German NCO who had cooperating with this particular agent was caught and executed.

G. SIGNALS UNITS CONNECTED WITH V WEAPONS

68. PW cannot give the exact history of the sigs units attached to the V weapon service but states that the original sigs unit connected with V weapons was the Korps Nachr Abt LXV attached to LXV Armeekorps. In 1944 when the Bevollmächtigter zbV Heer was appointed in the person of Genmaj DORNBERGER, an accompanying signals staff was created. PW thinks that DORNBERGER's organisation was connected with operations of the V1. This sigs staff was detached from HNW and attached to the Commander of the Reserve Army; it is commanded by Obstlt THOM who holds the title of Nafü B zbV Heer.
69. During the autumn of 1944 the FÜHRER grew dissatisfied with reports on the landing of V weapons. It appeared that the only sources of information were unreliable ones in SPAIN and SWEDEN. Consequently in Nov 44 HITLER ordered Oberst RANDEWIG, formerly CSO AOK8, to form a signals staff with the threefold task of studying the landing of V weapons and Allied jamming of V weapons, and the preparation of a technique for blocking Allied V weapons. Oberst RANDEWIG was appointed HÖh Wehrmachts Nachr FÜhrer 700 in which capacity he took over control of Obstlt THOM B zbV Heer. Oberst RANDEWIG and those units directly under him were subordinated to Ogruf KAMMLER Sonder Beauftragter 2 beim Reichsführer SS (in charge of V2 operations); otherwise Oberst RANDEWIG was only answerable to Gen PRAUN without any intermediary channels.

Authority E.O. 13526

ORDER OF BATTLE

70. Höh Wehrmachts Nachr Führer zbV 700 (Oberst RANDEWIG with status of Brigade Kommandeur) controlling:

Fest Nachr Aufkl Stelle HUSUM attached to this HQ.

Nachr Abt (mot) 1191 consisting of: Tel Constr Coy (mot)
WT Coy (mot)
Supply Column

Nachr Abt (mot) 1192 Funkhorch

(intercept): 1 Mot Sigs Coy
1 WT Coy (intercept)

Nachr Führer B zbV Heer controlling

Nachr Abt mot 1200
Telephons Constr Coy
WT Coy
WT Coy (intercept)
Supply Column

TECHNICAL

71.

PW can provide very little information on the technical side of Oberst RANDEWIG's activities. He has heard from Oberst RANDEWIG that as a result of a WT Signal emitted by the V2 before landing, it is possible to DF the fall of the rocket. Oberst RANDEWIG maintains that, allowing for a percentage of wide misses, it is possible to predict the landing of rockets within a radius of 3 kms. RANDEWIG has also monitored Allied efforts to jam V1 by wireless but was unable to carry out experiments for jamming Allied V weapons, as the Allies have not yet used any V weapons.

Authority EO. 13526

H. SS SIGNALS UNITS

(See SIR 1599)

GENERAL

72.

PW cannot give very detailed information on the organisation and strength of the SS Signals service. SS Signals matters were kept very secret and the OKW knew very little about them; in fact Gen PRAUN was continually discovering new SS Signals units of which he had never heard.

HIGHER SIGNALS ORGANISATION

73.

Although PW has a number of addresses of high SS Signals personalities in his possession, he has no knowledge of the higher command. It appears, however, that SS Brigadeführer and Genmaj der Waffen SS KELLHAUS, is the undisputed master of Signals matters within the SS, since he holds the offices of Inspekteur d Nachr Tp, Chef des Fernmeldewesens and Chef SS Führungshauptamt Amt I/N. KELLHAUS also controls the Signals machinery within the RSHA through the intermediary of Standartenführer SANZONI, whose exact function PW does not know.

ORDER OF BATTLE

74.

PW knows of the following two Signals units in the SS:

Führungs Nachr Regt 503 - Commanded by SS Ostubaf Wilhelm KOENIG. This unit is the GHQ Signals formation for the higher command of the SS. PW cannot give details of its strength.

Nachrichten Regt zbV 506 - Commanded by Maj FORETSCHKIN. This Signals unit operates under the orders of Ogruf SCHELLENBERG of Mil Amt RSHA and maintains communications with German agents behind the Allied lines. In Feb 45 FORETSCHKIN's HQ was located near BELZIG in the neighbourhood of BERLIN. (PW cannot pinpoint).

SIGNALS AND
UNDERGROUND
WARFARE

75. Although PW is fully aware that an underground organisation requires an efficient Signals service, he states that no preparations for underground warfare have been made within the OKW or OKH. He assumes, therefore, that the Signals aspect for underground warfare will be undertaken by the appropriate departments of the SS.

76. PW makes the following points which may be of interest:

A certain Maj NEUBAUER, who works in the SKORZENY organisation visited Gen PRAUN to obtain Signals equipment.

The "Hoeres Schule für Bandenkampf und Alarm Einheiten" which was located in the Truppen Übungsplatz KLEINE KARPATHEN in Autumn 44, sent a request to Gen PRAUN for an experienced Signals officer as an instructor. In PW's opinion this school was run by the SS.

From a document in PW's possession it appears that the Signals aspect of terrorist and sabotage work was taught at this school.

I. MISCELLANEOUS

TELEPHONE
SECURITY

77. It has been laid down that Gen PRAUN, as Chef HWV and WNV is not responsible for telephone security; this task has been handed over to the Geheime Feldpolizei. The monitoring service at OKH is controlled by Feldpolizei Direktor ARLT. It should be observed that in the OKW there are numerous retired officers who have been recalled and given the job of monitoring telephone conversations. Despite the strict monitoring of conversations at FHQ, OKW and OKH, important leakages of information still occur and are published 24 hours after in the STOCKHOLM Press.

DURCHGANGS
VERMITTLUNGEN

78. Location of Exchanges

LAUF. A DV was ordered here by the army in Mar 45. Originally it was to be located at NÜRNBERG, but this town was considered too dangerous owing to bombing risk. Finally it was decided to construct the exchange at LAUF.

VILLACH DV ALPEN is situated here.

LANDSHUT A DV has been constructed here. PW has no further details.

OVERHEAD
TELEPHONE
NETWORK

79. In the course of last year an overhead telephone network has been constructed in GERMANY by the Army. The authorities preferred this to a network of underground cables as these were more difficult to repair in the event of disruption. The overhead network runs along the main roads. It is, however, not as comprehensive in its scope as the network constructed by the GAF.

PRINTING OF
CODES AND
CIPHERS

80. Codes and ciphers were printed by an army printing unit at DRESDEN. PW has heard that since the bombing of DRESDEN this unit has moved to HALLE.

TIGHTENING UP
GERMAN
SIGNALS SECURITY

81. During the past year Obstlt HÖPFNER, formerly head of Gruppe IV Chef HNw, Comd KNA 8, and now head of OKW/WNV/Chi, was mainly responsible for tightening up Signals security. HÖPFNER personally invented the Rasterschlüssel and also controlled the policy of issuing call signs and allocating wavelengths. PW cannot elaborate on the more technical details of the Rasterschlüssel.

SIGNALS
EQUIPMENT

82. Owing to the critical war situation no new signals equipment is now being developed. The production of Signals equipment, although not satisfactory, has not been as bad as the supply of equipment for some other branches of the service. About 62% of the German Signals equipment industry is located round BERLIN and consequently the Allies have not yet captured the most important centres of the Signals industry.

GHQ SIGS
UNIT AT
BERCHTESGADEN

83. PW states that in Mar 45 the 2nd Bn Führungs Nachr Regt 601 was stationed in BERCHTESGADEN.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 13526

J. PERSONALITIES

84.

OKW/W Fu St/
WNV

Chief WNW Gen d Nachr Tp FRAUN
 Chief Ag WNW Genlt GIMMLER
 Bevollm Gen/Chief WNW Genlt SCHRADER. In charge of signals
 rationalisation.

Ag/WNV/Z

Chief WNV/Z Maj PRÖBSTER (temporarily)
 " " " Obstlt TRÖSKEN (formerly head of this dept,
 in Feb 45 appointed CSO DANZIG)

Z Ia Maj ADLER
 Z Ib Maj PRÖBSTER
 Z Id Amtsrat WAAK
 Z Ie Obstlt NEUMANN

Registatur Angestellter NEITZEL

WNV/KFA

Chief KFA Obst von KNOBELSDORFF-BRENKENHOFF. Senior
 LO with the Reichspost.

St/O Maj BRÜGGEN
 St/P Kriegsverwaltungsrat PIPPART
 St/F Maj LOHSE (Sigs officer FHQ)

KFA I Maj MAGNUSSSEN

KFA II Amtsrat KEUTEL

KFA III Obstlt Dr BETHGE

Registatur Angestellter SCHACK

Ag WNV/Fu

Chief WNV/Fu Obst ROSENKRANZ

Fu I Maj v LAFFERT

Fu Ia Htm POMMER

Fu Ia 1 Hptm MUSHAJE

Fu Ib Amtmann MOHR

Fu II Obstlt FUCHS

Fu III Maj von BARY (also Kdr der Funküberwachung, OKW)

Fu Reg Sekretär REINHARDT

Ag WNV/GBN

Chief GBN Obst Dr Ing GRUBE

GBN/A Maj ZELLIEN

GBN/B Hptm GORN

GBN/St Maj TÜXEN

GBN/I Maj HENKEL

GBN/II Maj Dipl Ing GLOECKNER

GBN/III Maj DÖLITZSCH

GBN/IV Obstlt BALDUS

GBN/Reg Min Reg TRIPHAN

Ag WNV/Chi

Chief WNV/Chi Obst KEPTLER. Until 15 Apr 45 then supposed
 to take up appointment of Höhere Nachr.
 Führer AOK 15. Successor designate Obstlt
 HÖPFNER formerly in charge of OKH/HNW/
 Gruppe IV, and inventor of the Rasterschlüssel.

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Chi/I Maj METTIG
 Chi/II Oblt SEYFARTH
 Chi/III Obstlt KÄHLER, Reg Baurat SALZBRUNN
 (technical asst)
 Chi/IV Min Rat FENNER
 Chi/V Tech O/Insp BUCK
 Chi/X Obstlt von KALCKSTEIN

OKH/HNW

Chief of Staff Obst d G HEPP
 Ia Obstlt POLENZ
 HNW/Gruppe Z Maj SCHLAEFFENBERG
 Officers' Records

" " Hptm RIEDEL

OR Records Oblt KERSTING

HNW/Gruppe I/I¹ Maj GRÜNWALD
 Hptm MÜLLER

I^E Maj HÜNLICH

I² & Hptm Dr GRATZNER
NSFO

I³ & Maj RASOCHA
I⁴

I⁵ Amtmann KNÜP
O/Insp SCHÖPS

HNW/Gruppe III Maj WASSERSECK
 (Functions unknown) Hptm JALOSS
 Oblt GEFFERT
 Lt MÜLLER-MEES
 O/Insp ALBRECHT
 O/Insp HUBRICH
 Insp COCHLOVIUS
 Insp ROTHENBERGER

HNW/Gruppe Maj BINDER
 Oblt RÜPPEL
 Amtmann BODELMANN

INSPEKTEUR
DER NACHR TP

Inspekteur Genlt RUSSWURM
 Assistant Maj ERHARDT

AHM/AMTSGRUPPE
NACHR

Chef Genmaj ARNOLD
 Personalgruppe Maj RUFER
 Maj HERBRIGGEN

Verwaltungsgruppe Wm ENGELHARDT
 Gruppe NH Maj Dr ROSENOW
 Lt GLEDE
 NH-Stabsführerin ULBRICH

AMTSGRUPPE
NACHR/
NACHR ABT
(In 7)

Abt Chef Obstlt i G SELON
 Gruppe Ia Maj GRAUS
 Oblt WILMANN
 O/Amtmann MAIER
 O/Plan KRÜGER
 O/Insp KARGESMÜLLER
 Pkm KLEINORN
 Maj Dr BRÜCKNER
 Tech O/Insp BRENNENSTEIN
 O Br Tauben Meister HIETSCH ?

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NACHR
NACHR ABT
(In 7)
(contd)

Maj BÖHM
Maj HERRAEUS
Oblt RÖHRS

Gruppe Ic

Antmann SCHÖNECK
Hptm MÖLLER
Oblt WEBER

Gruppe Id

Obstlt REDLICH
Maj LEHMANN
O/Insp KNESCHKE

Post Eingangsstelle

Uffz AMMER

NACHR GERÄT ABT

Chef

Obst HÖFFLER

Gruppe IIa

O/Antmann FIEGEL
Insp BUSSAS
Tech O/Insp SCHOSTOCK
O/Fkm KOLLER
O/Fkm HILDEBRAND
Maj EDELMANN

Gruppe IIb

Hptm THÄRICHEN
Dipl Ing MARQUARDT
Ing von KLICK
Ing MICHEL
O/Insp SPRINGER
O/Fkm BRÜSKE

Comd

Obst BOETZEL (formerly Höherer Nafü
AOK 6)

Officer abV

Obstlt ANDRLE. Formerly commanded the
Leitstelle der Nachr Aufkl OST in
LÖTZEN, now responsible for liaison
between Obst BÖTZEL and the OKH. He suc-
ceeded Obst von der OSTEN at LÖTZEN,
who commanded the Leitstelle d Nachr
Aufkl OST till he committed suicide after
the failure of the 20 Jul Putsch.

Asst to Obstlt ANDRLE
at Leitstelle Nachr
Aufkl OST

Hptm GORZOLLA

Höherer Kdr d Nachr
Aufkl beim OB W

Obst KOPP

KNA 6

Obstlt HERFURTH

Comd Auswertestelle 6

Hptm d R GREINER

KNA 5

Obstlt LECHNER (formerly of OKH/Chi)

Former Comd KNA 5

Oblt Baron v OER. Was unfit and had failed
to provide any signals intell on the
ARNHEM landing. Discharged from the
army in Oct 44.

Comd Auswertestelle 5

Hptm FURSMANN (probably formerly a coy
comd (NDEu/AA).

KNA 7

Obstlt SEEMÜLLER

Comd Auswertestelle 7

Hptm d R WENZEL. Succeeded Hptm (now
Major) OPITZ.

KNA 8

Obstlt HÖFTNER, now taking over the office
of Chef WNW/Chi.

Comd Auswertestelle 8

Hptm HANKE

KNA 1

Maj HÄNZLER (formerly comd Auswertestelle
7).

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AL DER
R AUFKLÄRUNG

GENERAL DER
NACHR AUFKLEHRUNG
(contd)

Cond Auswertestelle 1 Hptm RÖSSLER
KNV. 2 Maj ZÄRMAN
KNV. NORD Hptm d R GERISCH
KNV. 3 Obstlt FRANZ

Cond Auswertestelle 3 Maj d R LIMBERG

ADDITIONAL OKH
SIGNALS
PERSONALITIES

Liaison officer from
Chef HW to W Fu St Maj d G NIELSEN

Höherer Nafü beim
zbV Heer Obstlt THOM

Cond der Führer Nachr
Tp Obst AHRENS

HNW/Vorschriftenstelle
der Nachr Tp Maj HAUSCHILD. Temporarily in charge
in place of Obst WIESNER CSO 7th Army
and now P.).

Kdr der Heeres-Nachr
Schule 1, HALLE Genmaj WAGNER

Kdr der Heeres-Nachr
Schule 2, GLATZ Obst SCHILDER

Heeres Uffz Schule
für Nachr Tp ZEREST Obstlt KOLNIZGEN

Heeres Schule für
Nachr Helferinnen Obstlt von BRINKEN

OKH/Chef H Rü/Chef Wa
J Rü (Wa G 7) Obst STUMMER

OKH/Chef H Rü/Chef
(Wa Prüf 7) Obst HENIGST

OKH/AHL/Chef Fz In 4 D Antrat KLASCHKE

In charge of Tel
Security OKH Feldpolizeidirektor ARLT

MISCELLANEOUS
COMDS UNDER OKW

General zbV B Chef WNW Genmaj PRIMEZ

Höherer Wehrmacht Nafü
zbV 700 Obst RANDEWIG

Adjut " " " Hptm HUY

Armee Nafü LOK 20, also
Höherer Wehrmacht
Nafü beim OK d Wehr-
machts Befehlshaber
NORWAY Genmaj MENNY

Wehrmacht Nafü beim
Wehrmachts Befehls-
haber in den Nieder-
landen HOLLAND. Genmaj CLAES (Lr)

Wehrmacht Nafü beim Be-
vollmächtigten Gen d
deutschen Wehrmacht
HUNGARY Obst PRÜTZMANN

Wehrmachts Nafü beim
Wehrmachts Befehls-
haber DENMARK Obst ETZDORF

Deutscher Wehrmachts
Nafü SLOVAKIA Obstlt KRIEGER

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Höherer Nafü bei Bevollmächtigtem General d deutschen Wehrmacht in ITALY

Obst von der OSTEN ?

Stabsoffizier der Nachr Tp BOHEMIA/MORAVIA, (PRAGUE)

Obst RUPRECHT

Royal Hungarian Nachrichtengertät Verbindungsstab

Obst in Goniestab KERENZI, WIEN
Hohe Warte 46

OKL/General Nafü

General der Luft Nachr Tp MARTINI

OKL/General Nafü/Chef der Luft Nachr Inspektion

Genmaj GOSEWISCH

RdL und Obdl/TLR/Chef C-B 4 (Ordering of Sigs equipment)

Obst WOLFERMANN

RdL und Obdl/TLR/Chef C-E 4 (Development of Sigs equipment)

O/Stabs Ing d B GROMOLL

OKM/Chef 4 See Kriegsführung

Konteradmiral KRAUSS

OKM/Chef N Wa (Ordering of Sigs equipment)

Kapitän zS SCHÜLER

OKM/Chef N Wa II

Kapitän zS BIESTERFELD

OKM/Chef N Wa IV

Kapitän zS (W) THILL

OKM/Chef WEM (Development of Signals Equip)

Prof KÜPFMÜLLER

Reichsführer SS/Chef d Fernmeldewesens, SS Führungshauptamt I/N and Inspekteur der Nachr Tp

SS Brigafü und Genmaj der Waffen SS KEILHAUS. (This officer is in charge of all SS Signals matters).

Deputy to Brigafü KEILHAUS

SS Oberführer FÜRTHALNN

Reichsführer SS Chef d Dienststunde und Brief-taubenwesens

Brigafü MÜLLER-DARSS

Personal adviser to Reichsführer SS in Signals matters

Ogruf SACHS (formerly an army officer and predecessor of Brigafü KEILHAUS)

RSHA/Mil Amt/Mil E/ Kommandeur Nachr Regt zbV 506

Maj FORETSCHEKIN. In charge of receipt of agents' Signals traffic.

In charge of Signals matters RSHA

Stafu SANZONI. Exact post unknown.

RSHA/Mil Amt/Mil A 1/N Telephone and teleprinter matters

Hptm WOITHE

Comd 503 SS Führungs Nachr Regt

Ostubar KOMNIG

Partei Kanzlei Amt Nachr Wesen

Reichsamtleiter HERRHUT

Insp d Nachr Wesens with the SA

O ruf HERZOG

LW SIGNALS PERSONALITIES

SIGNALS PERSONALITIES

SS SIGNALS PERSONALITIES

NSDAP SIGNALS PERSONALITIES

Authority FO 13526

OT SIGNALS
PERSONALITIES

Nachr FÜhrungs Amtbau-OT
d Reichsminister für RÜ
und Kriegsproduktion

Maj Dr BERGLINN, BERLIN CHARLOTTEN-
BURG 9, Avus/Nordschleife

Nafü d OT in RUHRGEBIET

Stabsfrontführer HOHNE

REICHSBAHN

Höherer Nafü beim Ver-
kehrstab d Reichsbahn

Obst MUEGGE (formerly KNA 7 and
Höherer Nafü AOK 15.

TECHNICAL FER-
SONNEL DEALING
WITH THE PRODUC-
TION OF SIGNALS
EQUIPMENT

Note: All these specialists are members of special committees
appointed by Reichsminister SPEER and deal with Sigs
equipment production.

Head of the Electro Tech
Committee of Reichs-
minister SPEER, member of
the firm of SIEMENS &
HALSKE AG. This
specialist has moved
to HALLE with W Fu
St./NV.

Direktor Dr LÜSCHEN,
BERLIN-MANNSEE, Stimmingstr 5

Specialist in the produc-
tion of agents' trans-
mitters, employed by
TELEFUNKEN. Head of
the Committee under
Reichsminister SPEER
for ground wireless
equipment, including
Radar.

Direktor Dr RÖTTGARDT

Member of the STANDARD
Gesellschaft and di-
rector of NIK and
GENEST AG, head of
the special committee
under Reichsminister
SPEER for telecommu-
nications.

General Direktor HOPPELANN
BERLIN SCHÖNEBERG, Geneststr 5

Member of the LORENZ AG,
head of the committee
for transmitters under
5 kilowatts.

Maj a D SCHMID
BERLIN TREBBELHOF, Lorenzweg 1

Member of DEUTSCHE KABEL-
WERKE AG. In charge of the
special section on wires
and cables.

Direktor Dr MAIER
BERLIN, Boxhagenerstr 80

Member of FELTEN und
GUILLEAUME. Head of
the committee for over-
head trunk communications.

Dipl Ing SCHNEIDER
BERLIN SW 11, Anhalterstr 5

Member of SIEMENS & HALSKE
AG. Head of the committee
for low tension electrical
fittings.

Direktor LEIPER

Member of AEG

Direktor KLEMM
BERLIN NW 40, Friedrich Karl Ufer 2-4

BLAUPUNKTWERKE GMBH.
Head of the Committee
for radio reception
and television.

Direktor Dr GOERZ

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84. (contd)

TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
DEALING WITH THE
PRODUCTION OF
SIGNALS EQUIPMENT
(contd)

Member of ABG •
specially empowered
expert in remote
control.

Direktor Prof Dr GLADENBECK
BERLIN NW 40, Friedrich
Karl Ufer 2-4.

SIGS PERSONNEL
CONNECTED WITH
V WEAPONS

Officers in Korps
Nachr Abt 65

Oblt von EICHBORN
Oblt MARTINI

I.C.(U.K.)
r 45

DISTRIBUTION:

M.I.19(a)	War Office	{95 copies}
N.I.D.	Admiralty	{ 4 copies}
A.D.I.(K)	Air Ministry	{24 copies}

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APPENDIX 1

SIGNALS ORGANISATION IN THE HIGH COMMAND

HITLER, Oberstebefehlshaber der Wehrmacht

FM KEITEL (deputy)

w Fu St Genobst JODL

(Personal subordination)

W Fu St/Chef WNV
Gen PRAUN

Chef Ag WNV
(See Appdx 2)

Oberbefehlshaber
des Heeres
HITLER (KEITEL)


Chef WNV (Chef Besprechung)
Inter-service Conference

SS HIMMLER

KEILHAUS
Comd all SS Sigs
(assisted by
SS Oberfu FÜRTH)

OKL GOERING

Gen d Nachr-
truppe MARTINI



SIGNALS ORGANISATION

Reichsminister SPEER
(Production
Committees)

Genobst JODL
Chef W Fu St
:
Gen PRAUN
W Fu St/Chef W
:
Chef Ag WNV
Genlt GIMMLER
:

:
Gruppe Z (central)
:

:
KFA
(Line comms)
:

:
GEN
(Supply etc)
:

: : : : :
Ia Ib Id Ie Reg
Org Person- Admin Liaison
nel

: : : : : : :
St/O St/P St/F I II III Reg
Internal Planning PHQ Networks Raw Materials Records

: :
I I
Org WT

: : : :
A B St I
Internal Supply Special Line
 matters Sect

Authority *EQ 13526*

St)

Obst RANDEWIG
Höhere Wehrmachts Nachrichtenfu 700

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Authority EO 13526

Chi (Intercept and Code-breaking)

Chi Z Internal I Org II Evaluation III Intercept IV Deciphering V Line X Agents

Static WT stations

Ia¹ Ciphers Ib Procedure Fu II Eqpt and priorities Fu III Security Fu Reg

Liaison with RSHA

Kdr Fu Überwachung OKW

HQ units Übw 1 (Heer) WEST Übw 2 (LW) SOUTH, SE Übw 3 (Heer) EAST

II WT Section III Economic IV Valves Reg

Genobst GUDERIAN
Ch Gen Stab/OKH
:
Gen PRAUN (Chef H
:
:

Kdr Führungs Nachrichten Truppe
Obst ARENS

Vorschriften-
stelle (Sigs
Instructions

Fu Nachr Nachr Regt Nachr Regt Fu Nachr Nachr Regt Nachr Regt Nachr
Regt 601 zbV 597 zbV 604 Regt 40 zbV 514 zbV 618 zbV 51

GHQ Sigs Regts

Leitstelle Nachr Leitst
Aufkl WEST (?) Aufkl
(Evaluation) (E

Höh Kdr d Nachr Aufkl KNA 7 FN OST Nachr Aufkl
OBW (OB SUD-WEST) LOMSEN Abt 11
:
:
:
(DENMARK) (ACK 20 NORWAY)

KNA 5 KNA 6 Nachr Aufkl Abt 9
(Army Gp G) (AG B) (AG H)

Nachr Aufkl KNA 8 KNA 1 KNA 2 KNA NORD KNA
Abt 16 (AG SUD) (AG MITTE) (AG VISTULA) (AG NORD) (AG KI
(OB SUD-OST)

CSO CSO CSO CSO CSO CSO
OB WEST Befestigung OB OB AG AG
OST OST SUD-EST SUD-OST SUD BAL


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Chef des Stabes HNW (Obst d G HEPP)
Ia Obstlt POLENZ

Authority Ed. 1326

Wachr
DEPZEL

Admin




Instructions from these depts or Chief of Staff to
CSOs, Army Gps or Supreme Comds.

- : CSO AG HEINRICI
- : CSO AG VISTULA
- : CSO AG NORD
- : CSO AG KURLAND
- : CSO AOK 20
- : CSO Wehrmachts Befehlshaber DENMARK

A P P E N D I X 4

SIGNALS ORGANISATION (RESERVE ARMY)

Reichsführer SS HIMMLER (OB d E)



1F 108

C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.)
S.I.R. 1606
(Supplement)
18 Apr 45

THIS REPORT IS TOP SECRET

Report on further information obtained from PW CS/1702 Oblt ARWIZ
ADC to Chef der Wehrmachts Nachr Verbindungen
und Chef des Heeres Nachr Wesen, surrendered
near ALZEY, 19 Mar 45

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE
GERMAN SIGNALS SERVICE

OKH/Ob d E/AHA
Ag N/HNV

1. PW recollected the existence in the Reserve Army of an additional signals department. It is known as the Heeres Nachrichten Verbindung and is subordinated to the Amtsgruppe Nachr Wesen (S.I.R.1606, para 31). The status of this department is equivalent to that of the Stabsgruppe, the Nachrichtentruppen Abt and the Nachr Gerät Abt within the Ag N.

DUTIES AND
ORGANISATION
OF HNV

2. HNV is responsible for maintaining the signals communications of the Reserve Army. The department disposes of a number of sub-sections. PW does not remember their exact names. He knows there were separate sub-sections dealing with cable, WT, decimetre and teleprinter communications.

3. HNV controlled a number of officers known as LdN (Leiter des Nachrichtenbetriebes) who ran the Standort-Vermittlungen (Static exchanges) within the REICH.

UNITS CON-
TROLLED BY
HNV

4. PW underlines the distinction between the machine under Nachrichtentruppen Abt, i.e. Ersatz Abteilungen which are Sigs Regts under training as reserves for the Field Army, and the operational signals units placed under command of HNV which are there to service the Reserve Army. Among these latter he lists:
the Nachr Betriebs Abt/Ob d E
the Kabel Kp/OKW/OKH (?)
and other units which he cannot remember.



RELATIONS
OF HNV WITH
OTHER SIGNALS
DEPTMENTS

5. With the arrival of the land war in German territory, HNV has been hard put to it to defend its interests against the encroachments of other departments. The Kdr der Ffhrungs Nachrichtentruppen of the Field Army has been taking over static exchanges in the REICH for use as DVs to serve the Army Groups in the field. This poaching on the preserves of the static machinery has been ill-received by HNV.

PERSONALITIES
HNV

6. Chef HNV
Adjut HNV

Oberst KÖLLNER
Objt GOETZKE

MISCELLANEOUS

SIGNALS MAN-
POWER SITUA-
TION IN THE
WEHRMACHT

7. PW gives the following information without comment.
8. In 1943 the signals arm of the LW was twice the strength of the signals arm of the army.
9. In 1944 the LW evacuated 90,000 of its own signals personnel from FRANCE, exclusive of those captured or trapped in the ATLANTIC ports.
10. During the re-allocation of manpower in the Autumn of 1944 the signals arm of the army was unable to receive any of the skilled signallers of the LW, who were drafted into the infantry; instead the army signals arm received new untrained signallers from the LW.

C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.)
18 Apr 45

DISTRIBUTION:

M.I.19(a)	War Office	(95 copies)
H.I.D.	Admiralty	(4 copies)
...D.I.(K)	Air Ministry	(6 copies)

4R-86747
12th Ar. Grp
28 Mar 45

SECRET
SIGNAL SECTION
HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 699

Wunsch

312.1

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Chief Signal Officer, European Theater of Operations, APO 887, U S Army.
Attn: Director, Signal Intelligence Division.

The inclosed reports submitted to this headquarters are forwarded to your headquarters for your information.

For the Signal Officer:

F. C. Buehler
F. C. BUEHLER,
Lt Col, Signal Corps,
Executive Officer.



- 5 Incls:
- Incl 1 - Statements by PW Oberit H AMTTE, 23 March 1945.
 - Incl 2 - Organization and Location of German Army Signal Intelligence Service in the West, 26 March 1945.
 - Incl 3 - Appendix to Armed Forces Signal Administration, Operations section, 28 September 1944.
 - Incl 4 - Translation of above Appendix.
 - Incl 5 - Employment, Organization of the Signal Corps, 16 January 1945.

SECRET

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(Trans cards)

4R-8674
IF-JO

R.P


PROFORMA

Einsatz-Gliederung der Nachrichtentruppe


OKH/GEN-STAB DES HEERES/CHEF HNW IA Nr. 802 /45g.Kdos.vom 16.2.1945

In Aufriechung und Aufteilung:


Ob.d.F.:




Ob.Wstf. (OKW):



Süd:



W.B. Dänemark:



Verbindungsstäbe:

- Italien**
Verb Stab d OKW in Duca (Verb Stab: Obstfr Jandl)
Kochertruppe: 10 Offr, 1 Uffr, 5 M (a)
Rahmenpersonal für ital Heeresverbände: 1 Nachtr OB, 4 M (a)
- Ungarn**
W/NF Ungarn (Obst Prützmann) als Nafü bei Bev Gen d d Wehrmacht in Ungarn
1 Verb Kdo z b V 152 zu Bev Gen d ung Gen Stab (Gen Lt Kowatz)
1 Verb Kdo bei Erkundungsstab Gen Fischer (AOK 8)
1 Verb Kdo bei Stab des Chefs des Ausb West (Gen Obst Ternegg)
1 Verb Stab zu ung AOK 3 } 1 Nafü B/R 2 Sachbearbeiter K/B 1 techn Beamter K/B
1 Verb Stab zu ung AOK 1 }
6 Verb Kdos zu ung Korps
9 Verb Kdos zu ung Inf Div
1 Verb Kdo zu ung 2. Pz Div
1 Verb Kdo zu ung 1 Hus Div
1 Verb Kdo zu ung 1 Geb Brig
4 Verb Kdo zu ung Res Div

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RP
H. ARNTZ
23 MAR 45

Frontpage (Signal Squad) are assigned to Division, Corps, Division etc. by the General of Signals whenever the necessary orders. These units then directly communicate with GEC or Army Group, etc. At present, for example, the regiment which is still located on HADEN, the division on CHEN, and the 2nd Army which is cut off at HADEN, are in direct communication with the GEC.

The central radio station of the GEC is located at HADEN-ROSEN. However, a new station has been built at STEINHEIM, Thüringen, which has already taken over part of the traffic for GEC and which is to replace the station at HADEN-ROSEN eventually.

Reports of interference of wireless traffic are sent to the Army Signal Officer (Arms Nachrichten Fühler) from the Division Signal Officer. If they are of sufficient importance they are sent to the Army Group Signal Officer (Arms Nachrichten Fühler) from there. Reports go on to GEC from there. (Sik to GEC)

At GEC there are two sub-sections of W/F/AG LNW (Arbeitsgruppe W/F/AG LNW) (wireless section) under Col. Hauptmann Hans Buchholz. The location of all new stations by means of Direction Finding (DF) messages and direction finding. It has been told that almost all allied traffic is intercepted eventually. *Versteckt in der Luft*

Staff Division there is a RMT (Reichswehr Nachrichten Fühler) which is used for close-in traffic which is usually located 2-3 km behind the frontlines and contains all enemy traffic in the divisional sector. This RMT usually consists of one decoder, two encoders, and one W/F. In charge. Each division also has one W/F apparatus. (Koboldpöcker)

The information the RMT collects goes to the Div. Signals Officer who is also in command of one telephone company and one wireless Co. If the information is of more than immediate tactical importance, or if the RMT is unable to decipher it, it goes to Corps. At every Corps there is a RMT (Reichswehr Nachrichten Fühler) - Signal Section. Staff. Composed of about 20-30 men, which is located near Corps Hq. There the more difficult cases are broken and the information is relayed down to the divisions by land wire. Wireless is used only if absolutely necessary because of the competition of wireless frequencies. Several communication channels are used between these Signal Installations.

There are a number of W/F apparatus at Corps. At Army level there is a Reichswehr Nachrichten Fühler (Sig. Section, Co.) for close-in Direction Finding. At Army Group level there is also a Co. for close-in Direction Finding plus one company for long-range W/F and the Reichswehr Nachrichten Fühler (Sig. Section, Div. Hq.). All long-range W/F companies are now in the Interior of Germany, one for instance Berlin on the front the rest front to KAUZEN. Every Co. has about 500 men. It is believed that none of these companies handles any receiving set for such Allied net.

In charge of all intercept is the General der Nachrichten Fühler (General of Signal Installations) at present Col. Bockel. He has recently served from EISEN to GEC (W/F) (Arbeitsgruppe W/F/AG LNW). His W/F abilities are excellent. He is in charge of the Signal Section of the Army Group, which gives the latest locations of our stations. (Kommandeur der Nachrichten Fühler) At each Army Group there is directly responsible to the General of Sig. Section, another office has now been established at the Kommandeur der Nachrichten Fühler. He is in charge of Sig. Section, of the three Army Groups in the West and his W/F are with those of the G. in 6. West. The section is now organized by Col. Kopp and his W/F are with Kommandeur's at EISENHEIM (Sheet 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100).

SECRET

Appendix to Armed Forces Signal Administration, Operations Section, Nr. 2102/44. Confidential, dated 22 Jan. 45.

Extract from the Directives and Work Schedules for the Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Administration, Chief Signal Administration Office and Subordinate Departments.

- 1.) Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Administration (Chief NW): Controls Armed Forces Signal Commands.

Lt. Gen. Fromm.....	J2 1037
Order Office.....	J2 1038
(Secret Letter Register)	
Lt. Gen. Gieseler.....	J2 1035
Order Office.....	J2 1034
- 2.) Chief Signal Administration Office (Ag NW): Chief Signal Officer.

The Chief Signal Administration Office (Ag NW) includes:	
Central Group (Z)	
Military Air Communications Section (KPA)	
Section of the Chief of Signal Equipment (GHW)	
Radio Section (Ru)	
Code Section (Ch)	
<u>Duty Officer, Chief Signal Office</u>J2 1036	

The Chief Signal Administration Office is the agency through which the Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Administration controls the Armed Forces Signal Commands. The Signal Commands are authorized to carry on correspondence with the Chief Signal Administration Office by virtue of their position in the chain of command.
- 3.) Central Group (Ag NW/Z) is the agency through which the Chief of the Armed Forces Signal Administration coordinates the Central Office of the Chief Signal Administration Office.....Lt. Col. Tröskem.....J2 1067

Order Office.....		J2 4078
1 Ia: Employment and Organization, Directives, Journal, Mobilization and Demobilization.....	Major Adler.....	J2 1005
1 Ib: Personnel, trips, assignments, transfers, peacetime and wartime T/O's and T/O's, furloughs, billets, alternate offices, regulations, gas and air defense.....	Major Fröbster.....	J2 1004
1 Id: Administration, business, finance, transfer of foreign currency, pay classifications, illnesses and accidents of employees, group festivities, papers for official trips, ration cards for clothing and equipment, subsidies and assistance, furlough control.....	Amtsrat Wack.....	J2 4004
1 Ie: Liaison office in the Post Office Department, business dealings between the Armed Forces and the Post Office Department, in Non-signal-technical matters, deportments from military service, special Air Communications personnel.....	Lt. Col. Neumann.....	J2 3098

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